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Abstract 
This paper shows that a Nash equilibrium consisting of strategies of choosing a Pareto 
inefficient transition path is selected by households even without frictions as a result of 
the revealed government failure in supervision of financial markets. The Pareto 
inefficiency causes the generation of many of the phenomena observed in a depression 
(e.g., a persistently large amount of unutilized resources), and it is not necessary to use 
“animal spirits” to explain the generation of a depression. The revealed government 
failure in the supervision of financial markets and the resulting increased 
policy-induced uncertainty makes non-cooperative and risk-averse households behave 
more myopically, resulting in a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. When 
the failure of financial supervision is revealed, the household rate of time preference 
shifts upwards when the expected variance of steady-state consumption increases 
and/or its expected value shifts downwards. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  During a depression, the unemployment rate rises and the capital utilization 
rate falls more sharply and persistently than during a recession. The generation 
mechanism of unemployment and idle capital (i.e., unutilized resources) is usually 
attributed either to friction on quantity adjustments (e.g., prolonged searching and 
matching processes of employment) or friction on price adjustments (i.e., sticky prices 
and wages). During the Great Depression in the 1930s, unutilized resources were so 
huge that Keynes and his followers argued that the friction on quantity adjustments 
was not sufficient to explain the magnitude and persistence of unutilized resources and 
that friction on price adjustments was more important. Since then, the generation 
mechanism of unutilized resources has remained a puzzle, as has the shock that 
generates depression. Whether friction on quantity adjustments or on price adjustments 
is more important has been disputed, but the outcome of that discussion has been 
inconclusive.  
  Frictions on quantity adjustments of employment are usually explained by the 
search and matching models initiated by Mortensen and Pissarides (e.g., Pissarides, 
1985; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). However, Shimer (2005) argues that the 
standard version of search and matching models fails to account for the observed 
volatility of unemployment and vacancies. Shimer (2004), Farmer and Hollenhorst 
(2005), Hall (2005), Kennan (2006), Hall and Milgrom (2008), and Gertler and Trigari 
(2009) suggest the necessity of modifying the mechanism of wage formation in these 
models (e.g., introducing wage rigidity) to solve this shortcoming, because the 
wage-setting mechanism in the standard version of search and matching models (i.e., 
the Nash bargaining solution) is increasingly regarded as unsatisfactory (see also 
Hornstein et al., 2005; Yashiv, 2007). 
  Frictions on price adjustments cause rigidities in price movements. The 
rigidities hinder markets from quickly clearing, and unutilized resources such as 
unemployment are temporarily generated. However, friction on price adjustments has 
been criticized for its inability to explain the persistent nature of inflation, and 
skepticism about its economic importance remains. Mankiw (2001) argues that the 
so-called new Keynesian Phillips curve is ultimately a failure and is not consistent with 
the standard stylized facts about the dynamic effects of monetary policy (see also, e.g., 
Fuhrer and Moore 1995; Galí and Gertler 1999). The hybrid new Keynesian Phillips 
curve of Galí and Gertler (1999) solves this problem partly by incorporating lagged 
inflation into the models, but this solution raises another serious problem—why would 
rational agents behave partly in a backward-looking manner? Fuhrer (2006) concludes 
that the success of the hybrid new Keynesian Phillips curve is merely superficial, 
because the persistent nature of inflation is attributed mainly to lagged inflation. These 
arguments imply that stickiness of prices and wages is not very important 
economically. 
  Although friction on both quantity adjustments and price adjustments may 
well explain small-scale temporary phenomena, both appear insufficient as the 
mechanism generating the large-scale persistent phenomena that are observed in a 
depression. This insufficiency suggests that some unknown mechanism that amplifies 
the effects of the frictions exists. The main purpose of this paper is to search for such a 
mechanism. The presence of a persistently large amount of unutilized resources 
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implies that the economy is not persistently Pareto efficient. Pareto inefficiency usually 
may not be left as it is for a long period, but a Nash equilibrium can conceptually 
coexist with Pareto inefficiency. If a Nash equilibrium that consists of strategies 
generating Pareto inefficient payoffs is selected, unutilized resources as large and 
persistent as those observed in a depression may exist. This paper shows that a 
depression at such a Nash equilibrium—that is, a Nash equilibrium consisting of 
strategies of choosing a Pareto inefficient transition path of consumption to the steady 
state (hereafter called a “Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path”)—is generated 
even in a frictionless economy if—and probably only if—the rate of time preference 
shifts upwards. If the frictions are combined with this Nash equilibrium of a Pareto 
inefficient path, the effects of the frictions will be substantially amplified by the Pareto 
inefficiency of the transition path. An essential reason for the generation of this path is 
that households are intrinsically risk averse and not cooperative. In a strategic 
environment, this generates the possibility that, if consumption needs to be 
substantially and discontinuously increased to keep Pareto optimality, a 
non-cooperative household’s strategy to deviate from the Pareto optimal path gives a 
higher expected utility than the strategy of choosing the Pareto optimal path.   
  The Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path should not be confused with 
a Pareto inferior Nash equilibrium or a Nash equilibrium that is Pareto inefficient. 
They are conceptually quite different, although the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto 
inefficient path discussed in this paper is also a Pareto inferior Nash equilibrium and a 
Nash equilibrium that is Pareto inefficient. Multiple equilibria due to, for example, 
increasing returns, an externality or a complementarity in a macro-economic 
framework are usually Pareto ranked equilibria and include a Pareto inferior 
equilibrium (e.g., Morris and Shin, 2001). Such a Pareto inferior equilibrium usually 
indicates lower production and consumption than Pareto superior equilibria, suggesting 
a depression. However, if consumption is immediately adjusted completely when the 
economy is switched from a Pareto superior equilibrium to the inferior one, unutilized 
resources will not be generated as a result of the switch; therefore, merely showing the 
possibility of multiple Pareto ranked equilibria is not sufficient to explain the 
depression generation mechanism. A mechanism that generates huge and persistent 
unutilized resources during the transition path to the new equilibrium should be also 
presented, and the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path fully explains this 
mechanism. 
  If households are cooperative, they will always proceed on Pareto efficient 
paths because they will coordinate with each other to perfectly utilize all resources. 
Conversely, if they do not coordinate with each other, they may strategically not utilize 
all resources; that is, they may select a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. 
Such a possibility cannot be denied a priori, because a Nash equilibrium can coexist 
with Pareto inefficiency. In fact, households are intrinsically not cooperative—they act 
independently of one another. Suppose that an upward shift of the time preference rate 
occurs. All households will be knocked off the Pareto efficient path on which they 
have proceeded until the shift occurred. At that moment, each household must decide 
on a direction in which to proceed. Because they are no longer on a Pareto efficient 
path, households choose a path strategically on the basis of the expected utility 
calculated considering other households’ choices; that is, each household behaves 
non-cooperatively in its own interest considering other households’ strategies. This 
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situation can be described by a non-cooperative mixed strategy game. In this paper, I 
show that there is a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path in this game. 
  The important question remains, however: What causes the upward time 
preference shock? In other words, what ultimately causes a depression? Keynes (1936) 
suggests animal spirits as a driving force of economic fluctuations. Keynes’s (1936) 
definition of animal spirits is vague but probably indicates that some psychological 
factors (e.g., moods such as pessimism or optimism) overwhelm optimal actions from 
the point of view of rationally expected outcomes. These psychological factors drive 
households and firms to take actions even though the actions do not maximize their 
expected utilities and profits. The animal spirits argument implies that depression is a 
result of irrationality. This paper argues, however, that irrationality is not necessary to 
explain the generation of a depression.   
 The rate of time preference has been naturally supposed and actually observed 
to be time-variable since the era of Böhm-Bawerk (1889) and Fisher (1930). This 
paper presents an endogenous time preference model, in which the rate of time 
preference is inversely proportionate to the expected steady-state consumption. Hence, 
the model is consistent with many observations that the rate of time preference is 
negatively correlated with permanent income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991) and thus escapes 
from the drawback of Uzawa’s (1968) well-known endogenous time preference model. 
The model in this paper indicates that a shock to the expected steady-state 
consumption changes the rate of time preference. Nevertheless, steady-state 
consumption is intrinsically smoothed by the Ramsey-Euler equation (e.g., Brock and 
Mirman, 1972; Mirman and Zilcha, 1977); that is, it is nearly deterministic. In addition, 
the expected probability distribution of natural science technologies and knowledge is 
usually not substantially time-variable. Thus, the number of shocks that changes the 
expected steady-state consumption is limited, but policy-induced shocks are among the 
few such shocks. Such shocks make TFP (total factor productivity) become a 
stochastic process with an absorbing state, which results in substantially random 
steady-state consumption. Government policies in financial markets are particularly 
important. It has long been argued that financial development affects the level and 
growth of an economy (e.g., Levine, 1997; Wachtel, 2003; Do and Levchenko, 2007). 
In addition, there is a significant imperfection in financial markets—asymmetric 
information between financial institutions and investors (e.g., Gertler, 1988; Mishkin, 
1991)—that needs to be reduced by government supervision. This paper argues that the 
revealed failure in government supervision of financial markets is the origin of the 
shock to the expected steady-state consumption. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows that a Nash equilibrium of 
a Pareto inefficient path is rationally generated when the time preference rates of 
risk-averse and non-cooperative households shift upwards. In Section 3, an 
endogenous time preference model is constructed, in which the rate of time preference 
is inversely proportionate to steady-state consumption. Section 4 shows that the 
probability distribution of steady-state consumption is affected by policy-induced 
elements in TFP, particularly its financial element, and that the revealed failure of 
government supervision of financial markets originates the shock to steady-state 
consumption. In Section 5, the mechanism of depression is summarized, and policies 
to prevent and recover from depression are suggested. Finally, I offer concluding 
remarks in Section 6. 
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2.  NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF A PARETO 
INEFFICIENT PATH 
 
2.1  Model with non-cooperative households 
2.1.1  The shock 
 The model describes the utility maximization of households after an upward 
time preference shock. This shock was chosen because it is one of the few shocks that 
result in a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path (other possible shocks are 
discussed in Section 2.5). Another important reason for selecting an upward time 
preference shock is that it shifts the steady state to lower production and consumption 
than before the shock, which is consistent with the phenomena actually observed in a 
depression.  
  Although the rate of time preference is a deep parameter, it has not been 
regarded as a source of shocks for economic fluctuations, possibly because the rate of 
time preference is thought to be constant and not to shift suddenly. There is also a 
practical reason, however. Models with a permanently constant rate of time preference 
exhibit excellent tractability (see Samuelson, 1937). However, the rate of time 
preference has been naturally assumed and actually observed to be time-variable. The 
concept of a time-varying rate of time preference has a long history (e.g., 
Böhm-Bawerk, 1889; Fisher, 1930). More recently, Lawrance (1991) and Becker and 
Mulligan (1997) showed that people do not inherit permanently constant rates of time 
preference by nature and that economic and social factors affect the formation of time 
preference rates. Their arguments indicate that many incidents can affect and change 
the rate of time preference throughout life. For example, Parkin (1988) examined 
business cycles in the United States, explicitly considering the time-variability of time 
preference rate, and showed that the rate of time preference was as volatile as 
technology and leisure preference. Because time preference is naturally time-variable, 
models of endogenous time preference have been presented, the most familiar of which 
is Uzawa’s (1968) model. In Section 3, the endogeneity of time preference is examined 
in detail and an endogenous time preference model is presented as the mechanism of 
generation of the shock. 
 
2.1.2  Households 
  Households are not intrinsically cooperative. Except in a strict communist 
economy, households do not coordinate themselves to behave as a single entity when 
consuming goods and services. The model in this paper assumes non-cooperative, 
identical and infinitely living households and that the number of households is 
sufficiently large. Each of them equally maximizes the expected utility 
 
  ( ) ( )dtcuθtE t∫ ∞ −0 exp ,                        (1) 
 
subject to 
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  ( ) ttt ckAfdt
dk −= , ,                         (2) 
 
where yt, ct, and kt are production, consumption, and capital per capita in period t 
respectively; A is technology; u is the utility function; ( )tt kAfy ,=  is the production 
function; ( ) >θ 0 is the rate of time preference; and E is the expectation operator. yt, ct, 
and kt are monotonously continuous and differentiable in t, and u and f are 
monotonously continuous functions of ct and kt, respectively. All households initially 
have an identical amount of financial assets equal to kt, and all households gain the 
identical amount of income ( )tt kAfy ,=  in each period. It is assumed that ( ) 0>
t
t
dc
cdu  
and ( ) 02
2
<
t
t
dc
cud ; thus, households are risk averse. For simplicity, the utility function is 
specified to be the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function  
 
                        ( )
γ
ccu
γ
t
t −=
−
1
1
   if 1≠γ  
                        ( ) ( )tt ccu ln=    if 1=γ , 
 
where ∞<< γ0 . In addition, ( ) 0, >∂
∂
t
t
k
kAf  and ( ) 02
2
<∂
∂
t
t
k
kf . Technology A and labor 
supply are assumed to be constant. 
 The effects of an upward shift in time preference are shown in Figure 1. 
Suppose first that the economy is at steady state before the shock. After the upward 
time preference shock, the vertical line 0=
dt
dct  moves to the left (from the solid line 
to the dashed line in Fig 1). To keep Pareto efficiency, consumption needs to jump 
immediately from the steady state before the shock (the prior steady state) to point Z. 
After the jump, consumption proceeds on the Pareto efficient saddle path after the 
shock (the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path) from point Z to the lower steady state 
after the shock (the posterior steady state). Nevertheless, this discontinuous jump to Z 
may be uncomfortable for risk-averse households that wish to smooth consumption 
and not to experience substantial fluctuations. Households may instead take a shortcut 
and, for example, proceed on a path on which consumption is reduced continuously 
from the prior steady state to the posterior steady state (the bold dashed line in Fig. 1), 
but this shortcut is not Pareto efficient. 
  Choosing a Pareto inefficient consumption path must be consistent with each 
household’s maximization of its expected utility. To examine the possibility of the 
rational choice of a Pareto inefficient path, the expected utilities between the two 
options need be compared. For this comparison, I assume that there are two options for 
each non-cooperative household with regard to consumption just after an upward time 
preference shift. The first is a jump option “J”, in which a household’s consumption 
jumps to Z and then proceeds on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path to the 
posterior steady state. The second is a non-jump option “NJ”, in which a household’s 
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consumption does not jump but instead gradually decreases from the prior steady state 
to the posterior steady state, as shown by the bold dashed line in Figure 1. The 
household that chose the NJ option reaches the posterior steady state in period ( )0≥s . 
The difference in consumption between the two options in each period t is bt (≥ 0). 
Thus, b0 indicates the difference between Z and the prior steady state. bt diminishes 
continuously and becomes zero in period s. The NJ path of consumption (ct) after the 
shock is monotonously continuous and differentiable in t and 0<
dt
dct  if st <≤0 . In 
addition,  
 
                         tt ccc ˆ<<    if st <≤0  
                         cct =       if ts ≤≤0 ,  
 
where tcˆ  is consumption when proceeding on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle 
path and c  is consumption in the posterior steady state. Therefore, 
 
                      0ˆ >−= ttt ccb    if st <≤0  
                      0=tb             if ts ≤≤0 . 
 
  It is also assumed that, when a household chooses the option that is different 
from the option the other households choose, the difference in the accumulation of 
financial assets resulting from the difference in consumption (bt) before period s 
between the household and the other households is reflected in consumption after 
period s. That is, the difference in the return on financial assets is added to (or 
subtracted from) the household’s consumption in each period after period s. The exact 
functional form of the addition (or subtraction) is shown in Section 2.1.4. 
 
2.1.3  Firms 
  Unutilized products (bt) are eliminated quickly in each period by firms, 
because holding bt for a long period is a cost to firms. Elimination of bt is done by 
discarding the goods or preemptively suspending production, leaving some capital and 
labor inputs idle. However, in the next period, unutilized products are generated again 
because the economy is not proceeding on the Pareto efficient saddle path. Unutilized 
products are therefore successively generated and eliminated. Faced with these 
unutilized products, firms dispose of the excess capital that generates bt. Disposing of 
the excess capital is rational for firms, because the excess capital is an unnecessary 
cost for firms, but this means that parts of the firms are liquidated, which takes time 
and thus disposing of the excess capital will also take time. If the economy proceeds on 
the NJ path (that is, if all households choose the NJ option), firms dispose all of the 
remaining excess capital that generates bt and adjust their capital to the posterior 
steady-state level in period s, corresponding to households’ reaching the posterior 
steady state. Thus, if the economy proceeds on the NJ path, capital kt is 
 
                         tt kkk ˆ≤<   if st <≤0  
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                         kkt =      if ts ≤≤0 , 
 
where tkˆ  is capital per capita when proceeding on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle 
path and k  is capital per capita in the posterior steady state. 
  The real interest rate it is  
 ( )
t
t
t k
kAfi ∂
∂= , .                           (3) 
 
Because the real interest rate equals the rate of time preference at steady state, if the 
economy proceeds on the NJ path, 
 
                         θiθ t <≤~   if st <≤0  
                         θit =     if ts ≤≤0 ,                       (4) 
 
where θ~ is the rate of time preference before the shock and θ  is the rate of time 
preference after the shock. ti  is monotonously continuous and differentiable in t if 
st <≤0 . 
 
2.1.4  Expected utility after the shock 
  The expected utility of a household after the shock depends on its choice of J 
or NJ. Let Jalone indicate that the household chooses the J option but the other 
households choose the NJ option, NJalone indicate that the household chooses the NJ 
option but the other households choose the J option, Jtogether indicate that all 
households choose the J option, and NJtogether indicate that all households choose 
the NJ option. Let ( )10 ≤≤ pp  be the subjective probability of the household that the 
other households choose the J option (e.g., 0=p  indicates that all the other 
households choose option NJ). With p, the expected utility of the household when it 
chooses option J is,  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )JaloneEpJtogetherpEJE −+= 1 ,               (5) 
 
and when it chooses option NJ is 
 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )NJtogetherEpNJalonepENJE −+= 1 ,            (6) 
 
where ( )JaloneE , ( )NJaloneE , ( )JtogetherE , and ( )NJtogetherE  are the expected 
utilities of the household when choosing Jalone, NJalone, Jtogether, and NJtogether, 
respectively. With the properties of J and NJ shown in Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −++−= ∫∫ ∞s ts tt dtcuθtdtbcuθtpEJE ˆexpexp0  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −−++−−+ ∫ ∫∞s stt dtacuθtdtbcuθtEp 0 expexp1 ,   (7) 
 
and 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ +−+−= ∫ ∫ ∞s s ttt dtacuθtdtcuθtpENJE 0 ˆexpexp  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −+−−+ ∫∫ ∞ss t dtcuθtdtcuθtEp expexp1 0 ,          (8) 
 
where 
 
∫ ∫= s sr qr drdqibθa 0 exp ,                     (9) 
 
and  
 
∫ ∫= s sr qrtt drdqibia 0 exp ,                    (10) 
 
and the shock occurred in the period t = 0. Figure 2 shows the paths of Jalone and 
NJalone. Because there is a sufficiently large number of households and the effect of 
an individual household on the whole economy is negligible, then in the case of Jalone 
the economy almost proceeds on the NJ path, and in the case of NJalone it almost 
proceeds on the J path. If the other households choose the NJ option (Jalone or 
NJtogether), consumption after s is constant as c  and capital is adjusted to k  by 
firms in the period s. In addition, at and it are constant after s such that at equals a  
and is equals θ, because the economy is at the posterior steady state. Nevertheless, 
during the transition period before s, the value of it changes from the value of the prior 
time preference rate to that of the posterior. If the other households choose option J 
(NJalone or Jtogether), however, consumption after s is tcˆ  and capital is not adjusted 
to k  by firms in the period s and remains at tkˆ . 
  As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, the difference in the returns on financial assets 
for the household from the returns for each of the other households is added to (or 
subtracted from) its consumption in each period after period s. This is described by at 
and a  in equations (7) and (8), and equations (9) and (10) indicate that the 
accumulated difference in financial assets due to bt increases by compound interest 
between the period r to s. That is, if the household takes the NJalone path, it 
accumulates more financial assets than each of the other J households, and instead of 
immediately consuming these extra accumulated financial assets after period s, the 
household consumes the returns on them in every subsequent period. If the household 
takes the Jalone path, however, its consumption after s is ac − , as shown in 
equation (7). a  is subtracted because the income of each household ( )tt kAfy ,= , 
including the Jalone household, decreases equally by bt. Each of the other NJ 
households decreases consumption by bt at the same time, which compensates for the 
decrease in income; thus, its financial assets (i.e., capital per capita; kt) are kept equal 
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to tkˆ . The Jalone household, however, does not decrease its consumption, and its 
financial assets become smaller than those of each of the other NJ households, which 
results in the subtraction of a  after period s. 
 
2.2  Pareto inefficient transition path 1 
2.2.1  Rational Pareto inefficient path  
2.2.1.1  Rational choice of a Pareto inefficient path 
  Before examining the economy with non-cooperative households, I first show 
that, if households are cooperative, only option J is chosen as the path after the shock 
because it gives a higher expected utility than option NJ. Because there is no 
possibility of Jalone and NJalone if households are cooperative, then ( ) ( )JtogetherEJE =  and ( ) ( )NJtogetherENJE = . Therefore, ( ) ( ) =− NJEJE  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −+−−⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −++− ∫∫∫∫ ∞∞ ss ts ts tt dtcuθtdtcuθtEdtcuθtdtbcuθtE expexpˆexpexp 00
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ } 0ˆexpexp
0
>−−+−+−= ∫∫ ∞s ts ttt dtcucuθtdtcubcuθtE  since ttt bcc +<  
and tcc ˆ< . 
  Next, I examine the economy with non-cooperative households. First, the 
special case with a utility function with a sufficiently small γ is examined.  
 
Lemma 1: If ( )∞<< γγ 0  is sufficiently small, then ( ) ( ) 0>− NJtogetherEJaloneE .  
Proof: ( ) ( )[ ]NJtogetherEJaloneE
γ
−→0lim  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∫ ∫ ∞ →→ −−−+−+−= s s γtttγ dtcuacuθtEdtcubcuθtE 0 00 limexplimexp  
( ) ( )∫ ∫ ∞ −−−= s st dtaθtEdtbθtE 0 expexp  
( ) ( )∫∫ ∫ ∫ ∞ −⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛−−= s
s s s
r qrt
dtθtdrdqibEθdtbθtE expexpexp
0 0
 
( ) ( )∫ ∫ ∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛−−−= s s sr qrt drdqibθsEdtbθtE 0 0 expexpexp  
( ) ( )[ ]{ } 0expexpexp
0
>−−−= ∫ ∫s st qt dtdqitsθbθsE , 
because, if  st <≤0 , then θit <  and ( )[ ] ∫>− st q dqitsθ expexp . Therefore, because 
( )[ ] ∫>− st q dqitsθ expexp , ( ) ( ) 0>− NJtogetherEJaloneE  for sufficiently small γ.  ■ 
 
  Second, the opposite special case (i.e., a utility function with a sufficiently 
large γ) is examined.  
 
Lemma 2: If ( )∞<< γγ 0  is sufficiently large and if 
c
a
γ ∞→< lim0 , then 
                                                  
1 The idea of a rationally chosen Pareto inefficient path was originally presented by Harashima (2004b). 
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( ) ( ) 0<− NJtogetherEJaloneE . 
Proof: Because tb<0 , then for any period ( )st < , ( ) ( )[ ]=−+−−∞→ tttγγ cubcuc
γ
1
1lim  
0lim
11
=
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ + −−
∞→
γ
t
γ
tt
γ c
c
c
bc . On the other hand, because a<0 , then for any period 
( )st < , if 1lim0 << ∞→ c
a
γ
, ( ) ( )[ ] ∞=⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=−−−
−
∞→−∞→ １
γ
γγγ c
acuacu
c
γ
1
1 1lim
1lim . Hence, 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] +−+−−=−− ∞→−∞→−∞→ ∫ dtcubcuθtc γNJtogetherEJaloneEc γ tttγ
s
γγγγ
limexp1lim1lim
011
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 00limexp1lim 1 >∞+=−−−− ∞→∞−∞→ ∫ dtcuacuθtc γ γsγγ . Because 01 1 <−−γc γ  for any 
( )∞<< γγ 1 , then if 1lim0 << ∞→ c
a
γ
, ( ) ( ) 0<− NJtogetherEJaloneE  for sufficiently 
large ( )∞<γ .                                                       ■ 
 
The condition 1lim0 << ∞→ c
a
γ
 indicates that path NJ from c0 to c  deviates sufficiently 
from the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path and reaches the posterior steady state c  
not too late. Because steady states are irrelevant to the degree of risk aversion (γ), both 
c0 and c  are irrelevant to γ.  
 By Lemmas 1 and 2, it is proved that ( ) ( ) 0<− NJtogetherEJaloneE  is 
possible. 
 
Lemma 3: If 1lim0 << ∞→ c
a
γ
, then there is a ( )∞<< ∗∗ γγ 0  such that if ∞<<∗ γγ , 
( ) ( ) 0<− NJtogetherEJaloneE . 
Proof: If ( )0>γ  is sufficiently small, then ( ) ( ) 0>− NJtogetherEJaloneE  by 
Lemma 1, and if ( )∞<γ  is sufficiently large and if 1lim0 << ∞→ c
a
γ
, then 
( ) ( ) 0<− NJtogetherEJaloneE  by Lemma 2. Hence, if 1lim0 <<
∞→ c
a
γ
, there is a certain 
( )∞<< ∗∗ γγ 0  such that, if ∞<<∗ γγ , then ( ) ( ) 0<− NJtogetherEJaloneE .     ■ 
 
  However, ( ) ( ) 0>− NJaloneEJtogetherE because both Jtogether and 
NJalone indicate that all the other households choose option J; thus, the values of it 
and kt are same as those when all households proceed on the posterior Pareto efficient 
saddle path. Faced with these it and kt, deviating alone from the Pareto efficient path 
(NJalone) gives a lower expected utility than Jtogether to the NJ household. Opposite 
to Jtogether and NJalone, both Jalone and NJtogether indicate that all the other 
households choose option NJ and it and kt are not those of the Pareto efficient path. 
Hence, the sign of ( ) ( )NJtogetherEJaloneE −  varies depending on the conditions, as 
Lemma 3 indicates.  
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  By Lemma 3 and the property ( ) ( ) 0>− NJaloneEJtogetherE , the 
possibility of the choice of a Pareto inefficient transition path, that is, ( ) ( ) 0<− NJEJE , 
is shown. 
 
Proposition 1: If 1lim0 << ∞→ c
a
γ
 and ∞<<∗ γγ , then there is a ( )10 ≤≤ ∗∗ pp  such that 
if *pp = , ( ) ( ) 0=− NJEJE , and if *pp < , ( ) ( ) 0<− NJEJE . 
Proof: By Lemma 3, if ∞<<∗ γγ , then ( ) ( ) 0<− NJtogetherEJaloneE  and 
( ) ( ) 0>− NJaloneEJtogetherE . Here, ( ) ( ) =− NJEJE ( ) ( )[ ]NJaloneEJtogetherEp −  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]NJtogetherEJaloneEp −−+ 1  by equations (5) and (6). Thus, if 1lim0 << ∞→ caγ  
and ∞<<∗ γγ , ( ) ( )NJEJE
p
−→0lim ( ) ( ) 0<−= NJtogetherEJaloneE  and ( ) ( ) =−→ NJEJEp 1lim  
( ) ( ) 0>− NJaloneEJtogetherE . Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, there is ( )10 ≤≤ ∗∗ pp  such that if *pp = , ( ) ( ) 0=− NJEJE  and if *pp < , ( ) ( ) 0<− NJEJE . ■ 
 
Proposition 1 indicates that, if 1lim0 << ∞→ c
a
γ
, ∞<<∗ γγ , and *pp < , then the choice 
of option NJ gives the higher expected utility than that of option J to a household; that 
is, a household may make the rational choice of taking a Pareto inefficient transition 
path. The lemmas and proposition require no friction, and a Pareto inefficient transition 
path can be chosen even in a frictionless economy. This result is very important 
because it offers counter-evidence against the conjecture that households never 
rationally choose any Pareto inefficient transition path in a frictionless economy. 
 
2.2.1.2  Conditions for a rational Pareto inefficient path 
  The proposition requires several conditions. Among them, ∞<<∗ γγ  may 
appear rather strict. If γ* is very large, option NJ will be rarely chosen. However, if 
path NJ is such that consumption is reduced sharply after the shock, option NJ gives 
the higher expected utility than option J even though γ* is very small. For example, for 
any ( )∞<< γγ 0 , 
 
     ( ) ( )[ ]NJtogetherEJaloneE
ss
−→
1lim
0
 
     ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]dtcuacuθt
s
dtcubcuθt
s ssttt
s
s
−−−+−+−= ∫∫ ∞→→ exp1limexp1lim 000  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
cd
cdubcubcu
s
bscucucubcu
s 0000
0
0000
lim1 −−+=−−−−+= →
θ
θ  
     ( ) ( ) 0
111 0
1
0
1
00
0
1
0
1
00 <⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−−
+=−−
−+=
−−
−−
−−
b
γ
c
γ
bccccb
γ
cbc γγγγγγ
γ
, 
 
because ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 0
0
0
000
1
0
1
00
1
1lnlnln
11
lim b
c
bccbcc
γ
c
γ
bcc
γγ
γ
γ
<⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=−+=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−−
+ −−
→
 and 
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( ) 0
1
11
lim
11
lim
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
00 =
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +
=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−−
+
−
−
∞→
−−
∞→ γ
c
b
cc
γ
c
γ
bcc
γ
γγ
γ
γγ
γ
γ
 due to 0cc < . That is, for 
each combination of path NJ and γ, there is ( )0>∗s  such that, if ∗< ss , then 
( ) ( ) 0<− NJtogetherEJaloneE . 
  Consider an example in which path NJ is such that bt is constant as bbt =  
before s (Figure 3); thus ∫ =s t bsbE 0 . In this NJ path, consumption is reduced more 
sharply than it is in the case shown in Figure 2. In this case, because ∫ => s t bθsbEθa 0 , 
γ<0 , and ts cc <  for st < , then ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∫ −+−s ttt dtcubcuθtE 0 exp  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]sssss cubcuθ θsEcubcudtθtE −+−−=−+−< ∫ exp1exp0 , and in addition, 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]cuacu
θ
θsEcuacudtθtEdtcuacuθtE
ss
−−−=−−−=−−− ∫∫ ∞∞ expexpexp
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]cubθscu
θ
θsE −−−< exp . Hence, 
 
        ( ) ( )NJtogetherEJaloneE −  
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∫∫ ∞ −−−+−+−= ss ttt dtcuacuθtEdtcubcuθtE expexp0  
        ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]cubθscu
θ
θsEcubcu
θ
θsE ss −−−+−+−−< expexp1  
        ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−−−
−−−+−−= bθscucu
θs
θscubcu
θ
θsE ss exp1
expexp1 . 
 
As γ becomes larger, the ratio ( ) ( )( ) ( )bθscucu cubcu ss −− −+  becomes smaller; thus, larger values 
of s can satisfy ( ) ( ) 0<− NJtogetherEJaloneE . For example, suppose that c = 10, cs = 
10.2, b = 0.3, and θ = 0.05. If 1=γ , then s* = 1.5 at the minimum, and if 5=γ , then 
s* = 6.8 at the minimum. This result implies that, if option NJ is such that consumption 
is reduced relatively sharply after the shock (e.g., bbt = ) and *pp < , option NJ will 
usually be chosen. It is not a special case observed only if γ is very large, but it will 
normally be generated when the value of γ is within usually observed values. 
Conditions for generating a rational Pareto inefficient transition path therefore are not 
strict. In a depression, consumption usually declines sharply after the shock, which 
suggests that households have chosen the NJ option. 
 
2.3  Nash equilibrium 
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2.3.1  A Nash equilibrium consisting of NJ strategies  
  A household strategically determines whether to choose the J or NJ option, 
considering other households’ choices. All households know that each of them forms 
expectations about the future values of its utility and makes a decision in the same 
manner. Since all households are identical, the best response of each household is 
identical. Suppose that there are ( )NΗ ∈  identical households in the economy where 
H is sufficiently large (as assumed in Section 2.1). Let ( )10 ≤≤ ηη qq  be the 
probability that a household ( )Ηη ∈  chooses option J. The average utility of the 
other households almost equals that of all households because H is sufficiently large. 
Hence, the average expected utilities of the other households that choose the J and NJ 
options are E(Jtogether) and E(NJtogether), respectively. Hence, the payoff matrix of 
the Η-dimensional symmetric mixed strategy game can be described as shown in Table 
1.  
 
Table 1: The payoff matrix 
 
              Any other household 
  J  NJ  
      
J  E(Jtogether), E(Jtogether) E(Jalone), E(NJtogether) 
      
A
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 
NJ  E(NJalone), E(Jtogether) E(NJtogether), E(NJtogether) 
 
Each identical household determines its behavior on the basis of this payoff matrix. In 
this mixed strategy game, strategy profiles  
 
 (q1,q2,…,qH) = {(1,1,…,1), ( *** ,...,, ppp ), (0,0,…,0)}          (12) 
 
are Nash equilibria for the following reason. By Proposition 1, the best response of a 
household η is J (i.e., qη = 1) if *pp > , indifferent between J and NJ (i.e., any 
[ ]10,qη∈ ) if *pp = , and NJ (i.e., qη = 0) if *pp < . Because all households are identical, 
the best-response correspondence of each household is identical such that qη = {1} if 
*pp > , [0,1] if *pp = , and {0} if *pp <  for any household Ηη∈ . Hence, the mixed 
strategy profiles (1, 1,…,1), ( *** ,...,, ppp ), and (0,0,…,0) are the intersections of the 
graph of the best-response correspondences of all households. The Pareto efficient 
saddle path solution (1,1,…,1; i.e., Jtogether) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, but 
a Pareto inefficient transition path (0,0,…,0; i.e., NJtogether) is also a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium. In addition, there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium ( *** ,...,, ppp ).  
 
2.3.2  Selection of equilibrium 
  Determining which Nash equilibrium, either NJtogether (0,0,…,0) or 
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Jtogether (1,1,…,1), is dominant requires refinements of the Nash equilibrium, which 
necessitate additional criteria. Here, if households have a risk-averse preference in the 
sense that they avert the worst scenario when its probability is not known, households 
suppose very low p and select the NJtogether (0,0,…,0) equilibrium. Because 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ } dtacuacuθtdtcubcuθtENJaloneEJaloneE s
s ttttt∫ ∫ ∞ +−−−+−+−=− 0 ˆexpexp
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }∫ ∫ ∞ −−−+−+−< s sttt dtcuacuθtdtcubcuθtE 0 expexp  
( ) ( ) 0<−= NJtogetherEJaloneE ,                                          (13) 
 
by Lemma 3, then Jalone is the worst choice in the sense of the amount of payoff, 
followed by NJtogether, and NJalone, and Jtogether is the best. The outcome of 
choosing option J is more dispersed than that of option NJ. If households have the 
risk-averse preference in the above-mentioned sense and avert the worst scenario when 
they have no information on its probability, a household will prefer the less dispersed 
option (NJ), fearing the worst situation that the household alone substantially increases 
consumption while the other households substantially decrease consumption after the 
shock. This behavior is rational because it is consistent with preferences. Since all 
households are identical and know inequality (13), all households will equally suppose 
that they all prefer the less dispersed NJ option; therefore, all of them will suppose a 
very low p, particularly 0=p , and select the NJtogether (0,0,…,0) equilibrium, which 
is the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. Thereby, unlike most multiple 
equilibria models, the problem of indeterminacy does not arise, and animal spirits (e.g., 
pessimism or optimism) are unnecessary to explain the selection. 
 
2.4  Amplified generation of unutilized resources 
  A Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path successively generates 
unutilized products (bt). They are left unused, discarded, or preemptively not produced 
during the path. Unused or discarded goods and services indicate a decline in sales and 
an increase in inventory for firms. Preemptively suspended production results in an 
increase in unemployment and idle capital. As a result, profits decline and some parts 
of firms need to be liquidated, which is unnecessary if the economy proceeds on the J 
path (i.e., the posterior Pareto efficient path). If the liquidation is implemented 
immediately after the shock, bt will no longer be generated, but such a liquidation 
would generate a tremendous shock. The process of the liquidation, however, will take 
time because of various frictions, and excess capital that generates bt will remain for a 
long period. During the period when capital is not reduced to the posterior steady-state 
level, unutilized products are successively generated. In a period, bt is generated and 
eliminated, but in the next period, another, new, bt is generated and eliminated. This 
cycle is repeated in every period throughout the transition path, and it implies that 
demand is lower than supply in every period. This phenomenon may be interpreted as 
a general glut or a persisting disequilibrium by some definitions of equilibrium. 
  Because of the liquidation of firms, many employees are dismissed and capital 
is discarded. Note that a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path can be selected 
irrespective of frictions (as discussed in Section 2.2), and if the economy is frictionless, 
the liquidation will not raise the unemployment rate. However, if there are frictions on 
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quantity and price adjustments, the unemployment rate will rise substantially as a 
result of the liquidation. Unemployment “naturally” exists even on a Pareto efficient 
path because of frictions. The extra unemployment resulting from the liquidation 
caused by unutilized products is in addition to this natural unemployment. In this sense, 
unutilized products amplify the generation of unutilized resources. The extra 
unemployment and discarded capital can be huge and persistently generated during the 
Pareto inefficient transition path, matching the observed magnitudes of unutilized 
resources in depressions.  
 
2.5  Time preference shock as the exceptional shock 
  Not all shocks result in a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. If 
anything, this type of shock is limited because it needs to force consumption to 
fluctuate very jaggedly to maintain Pareto efficiency. A Pareto inefficient path is 
preferred, because these substantially jagged fluctuations can be averted. An upward 
time preference shock is one such shock, as shown in Figure 1. Other examples are 
rare, because shocks that do not change the steady state (e.g., monetary shocks) are not 
relevant. One other example is a technology regression, which would move the vertical 
line 0=
dt
dct  to the left in Figure 1 and necessitate a jagged consumption path to keep 
Pareto efficiency. In this sense, technology and time preference shocks have similar 
effects on economic fluctuations. However, a technology regression also 
simultaneously moves the curve 0=
dt
dkt  downwards, and accordingly, the Pareto 
efficient saddle path also moves downwards. Therefore, the jagged consumption is 
smoothed out to some extent. As a result, the substantially jagged consumption that 
can generate a depression would require a large-scale, sudden, and sharp regression in 
technology, which does not seem very likely. An upward time preference shock, 
however, only moves the vertical line 0=
dt
dct  to the left, which suggests that most 
depressions are generated by upwards time preference shocks. 
  In some macro-economic models with multiple equilibra, however, changing 
equilibria may necessitate substantially jagged consumptions to keep Pareto optimality. 
There are many types of multiple equilibra models that depend on various types of 
increasing returns, externalities, or complementarities, but they are vulnerable to a 
number of criticisms (e.g., insufficient explanation of the switching mechanism; see, 
e.g., Morris and Shin, 2001). Examining the properties, validity, and plausibility of 
each of these many and diverse models is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
3.  ENDOGENOUS TIME PREFERENCE 
 
  The results in Section 2 raise the question: what force drives households to 
shift their rates of time preference upwards? Keynes’s (1936) argument suggests that 
an upward time preference shift is caused by a change in households’ moods. Indeed, 
preferences may change stochastically by fluctuating moods. However, it is not 
compelling to accept the idea of animal spirits ad hoc because it implies irrationality. 
Before arbitrarily assuming irrationality, we should search for all possibilities of 
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mechanisms by which an upward time preference shift is endogenously generated as a 
consequence of rational agents’ rational behavior. 
 
3.1  Endogenous time preference models 
3.1.1  Uzawa’s (1968) endogenous time preference model 
  The most well-known endogenous time preference model is that of Uzawa 
(1968). It has been applied to many analyses (e.g., Epstein and Hynes, 1983; Lucas and 
Stokey, 1984; Epstein, 1987; Obstfeld, 1990). However, Uzawa’s model has not 
necessarily been regarded as a realistic expression of endogeneity of time preference 
because it has a serious drawback in that impatience increases as income, consumption 
and utility increase. The basic structure of Uzawa’s model is 
 
( )[ ]tt cuθθ ∗= , 
( )t
t
cdu
dθ<0 ,                           (14) 
 
in which the rate of time preference θt in period t is time-variable and an increasing 
function of present utility u(ct). The problem is that ( )t
t
cdu
dθ<0  is necessary for the 
model to be stable. This property is quite controversial and difficult to accept a priori, 
because many empirical studies have indicated that the rate of time preference is 
negatively correlated with permanent income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991); thus, many 
economists are critical of Uzawa’s model. Epstein (1987), however, argues the 
plausibility of increasing impatience and offers some counter-arguments. However, his 
view is in the minority and most economists support arguments in favor of the 
decreasing rate of time preference such that ( ) 0<t
t
cdu
dθ . Hence, although Uzawa’s 
model attracted attention from economists such as Epstein and Hynes (1983), Lucas 
and Stokey (1984), and Obstfeld (1990), analysis of the endogeneity of time preference 
has progressed very little. Although Uzawa’s model may be flawed, that does not 
necessarily mean that the conjecture that the rate of time preference is influenced by 
future income, consumption, and utility is fallacious, just that an appropriate model in 
which the rate of time preference is negatively correlated with income, consumption, 
and utility has not been presented.  
 
3.1.2  Size effect on impatience 
  The problem of ( )t
t
cdu
dθ<0  in Uzawa’s model arises because distant future 
levels of consumption have little influence on factors that form the rate of time 
preference; that is, it is formed only with the information on present consumption, and 
it must be revised every period in accordance with consumption growth. However, 
there is no a priori reason why information on distant future activities should be far 
less important than the information on the present and near future activities. Fisher 
(1930) argued that 
[O]ur first step, then, is to show how a person's impatience depends on 
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the size of his income, assuming the other three conditions to remain 
constant; for, evidently, it is possible that two incomes may have the 
same time shape, composition and risk, and yet differ in size, one being, 
say, twice the other in every period of time. 
  In general, it may be said that, other things being equal, the 
smaller the income, the higher the preference for the present over the 
future income. It is true of course that a permanently small income 
implies a keen appreciation of wants as well as of immediate wants. … 
But it increases the want for immediate income even more than it 
increases the want for future income.” (p. 72) 
 
According to Fisher’s (1930) view, a force that influences time preference is a 
psychological response derived from the perception of the “size of the entire income or 
utility stream.” This view indicates that it is necessary to probe how people perceive 
the size of the entire income or utility stream. 
  Little effort has been directed towards probing the nature of the size of utility 
or income stream on time preference, although a large number of psychological 
experiments have been made with regard to anomalies of the expected utility model 
with a constant rate of time preference (e.g., Frederick et al., 2002). Turning to 
research in economics, analyses using endogenous time preference models so far have 
merely introduced the a priori assumption of endogeneity of time preference without 
explaining its reasoning in detail. Hence, even now, Fisher’s (1930) insights are very 
useful for the examination of the size effect. An important point in Fisher’s above 
quote is that the size of the infinite utility stream is perceived as “permanently” high or 
low. The size difference among the utility streams may be perceived as the permanent 
continuing difference of utilities among different utility streams. Anticipation of the 
permanently higher utility may enhance an emotional sense of well-being because 
people feel they have a long-lasting secure situation, which will generate a positive 
psychological response and make people more patient. If that is true, distant future 
utilities should be taken into account equally with the present utility. Otherwise, it is 
impossible to distinguish whether the difference of utilities continues permanently.  
  From this point of view, the specification that only the present utility 
influences the formation of time preference, as is the case of Uzawa’s model, is 
inadequate as the specification of the size of utility stream. Instead, a simple measure 
of the size where entire utilities from the present to distant future are summed with 
equal weight will be more appropriate as the measure of the size of a utility stream.2 
 
3.2  Model of time preference 3 
3.2.1  The model 
 Because no strategic situation is supposed in this section unlike in Section 2, 
the usual representative household is assumed for simplicity, and the representative 
household solves the maximization problem indicated in equations (1) and (2). Taking 
                                                  
2 Das (2003) shows another stable endogenous time preference model with decreasing impatience. Her 
model is stable, although the rate of time preference is decreasing because endogenous impatience is 
almost constant. In this sense, the situation her model describes is very special. 
3 The idea of this type of endogenous time preference model was originally presented by Harashima 
(2004a). 
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the arguments in Section 3.1 into account, the “size” of the infinite utility stream can 
be defined as follows. 
 
Definition 1: The size of the utility stream W for a given technology A is  
 
( )∫∞→= T tT dtcutwEW 0 )(lim ,                     (15) 
 
where 
 
                        ( )
T
tw 1=   if Tt ≤≤0  
                        ( ) 0=tw    otherwise.  
 
The variable ( )tw  indicates weights and has the same value in any period. Thus, the 
weights for evaluation of future utilities are distributed evenly over time, as argued in 
Section 3.1. 
 To this point in my argument, technology A has been assumed to be constant, 
but if A is time-variable (At) and grows at a constant rate and the economy is on a 
balanced growth path such that At, yt, kt, and ct grow at the same rate, then the 
definition of W needs to be modified because any stream of ct and u(ct) grows to 
infinity, and it is impossible to distinguish the sizes of the utility stream by simply 
summing up ct with ∞→T  as shown in Definition 1. Because balanced growth is 
possible only when technological progress is Harrod neutral, I assume a Harrod neutral 
production function such that 
 
α
t
α
tt kωAy
−= 1 ,                          (16) 
 
where ( )10 << αα  and ( )ωω <0  are constants. To distinguish the sizes of utility 
stream, the following value is set as the standard stream of utility, 
 ( )ψtecu ~ , 
 
where ( )cc ~0~ <  is a constant and ( )ψψ <0  is a constant rate of growth. Streams of 
utility are compared with this standard stream. Because the utility function is CRRA as 
shown in Section 2, a stream of utility in comparison with the standard stream of utility 
is  
 
( )( ) ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛−== −−
−
ψt
t
γγψt
γ
t
ψt
t
e
cu
c
γ
ec
c
ecu
cu
11
1
~
1
~~ . 
 
By using this ratio, a stream of utility can be distinguished from the standard stream of 
utility. That is, the size of a utility stream W for a given stream of technology At that 
grows at the same rate ψ as yt, kt, and ct can be alternatively defined as 
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∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛= ∞→
T
ψt
t
T
dt
e
cuw(t)EW
0
lim .                    (17) 
 
Clearly, if ψ = 0, then the size (W) degenerates into the one shown in Definition 1. 
  If there is a steady state such that  
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]∗
∞→ = cuEcuE ttlim ,                     (18) 
 
or for the case of expected balanced growth 
 
( )[ ]∗
∞→ =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ cuE
e
cuE ψt
t
t
lim ,                    (19) 
 
where c* is a constant and indicates steady-state consumption, then  
 ( )[ ]∗= cuEW                          (20) 
 
for the following reason. Because ( )[ ] ( )[ ]∗
∞→ = cuEcuE ttlim (or =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∞→ ψt
t
t e
cuElim  
( )[ ]∗cuE ), then 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ } ( )[ ] WcuEdtcuEcuEw(t)T tT −=− ∗∗∞→ ∫0lim  
(or ( )[ ] ( )[ ] WcuEdt
e
cuEcuEw(t)
T
ψt
t
T
−=
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛− ∗∗∞→ ∫0lim ). 
 
In addition,  
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ } 0lim
0
=−∫ ∗∞→ dtcuEcuEw(t)T tT  
(or ( )[ ] 0lim
0
=
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−∫ ∗∞→ dtecuEcuEw(t)
T
ψt
t
T
). 
 
Hence, ( )[ ]∗= cuEW ; that is, the rate of time preference is determined by steady-state 
consumption (c*). 
  The model of time preference in this paper is constructed on the basis of this 
measure of W. An essential property that must be incorporated into the model is that 
the rate of time preference is sensitive to, and a function of, W such that 
 
( )Wθθ ∗∗= , 
 
where ( )Wθ ∗∗  is monotonously continuous and continuously differentiable. Because 
W is a sum of utilities, this property simply reflects the core idea of endogenous time 
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preference. However, this property is new in the sense that the rate of time preference 
is sensitive not only to the present utility but also the entire stream of utility, that is, the 
size of utility stream represented by the utility for steady-state consumption. This 
property is intuitively acceptable because it is likely that people set their principles or 
parameters for their behaviors considering the final consequences (i.e., the steady state; 
see, e.g., Barsky and Sims, 2009).  
 Another essential property that must be incorporated into the model is 
 
0<
dW
dθ . 
 
Because ( )[ ]∗= cuEW  and ( )
t
t
dc
cdu<0 , the rate of time preference is inversely 
proportionate to c*. This property is consistent with the findings in many empirical 
studies, which have shown that the rate of time preference is negatively correlated with 
permanent income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991).  
  In summary, the basic structure of the model is: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]{ }∗∗∗∗∗ == cuEθWθθ , 
( )[ ] 0<= ∗cudE dθdWdθ .                     (21) 
 
This model is deceptively similar to Uzawa’s endogenous time preference model (14), 
simply replacing ct with c* and ( )t
t
cdu
dθ<0  with ( )[ ] 0<∗cudE dθ . However, the two 
models are completely different because of the opposite characteristics between  
( )t
t
cdu
dθ<0  and ( )[ ] 0<∗cudE dθ .  
 
3.2.2  Nature of the model 
  The model (21) can be regarded as successful only if it exhibits stability. In 
Uzawa’s model, the economy becomes unstable if ( )t
t
cdu
dθ<0  is replaced with 
( ) 0<t
t
cdu
dθ . In this section, I examine the stability of the model. 
 
3.2.2.1  Equilibrium rate of time preference 
  In Ramsey-type models, such as equations (1) and (2), if a constant rate of 
time preference is given, the value of marginal product of capital (i.e., the value of the 
real interest rate) converges to that of the given rate of time preference as the economy 
approaches the steady state. Hence, when a rate of time preference is specified at a 
certain value, the corresponding expected steady-state consumption is uniquely 
determined. Given fixed values of other exogenous parameters, any predetermined rate 
of time preference has unique values of expected consumption and utility at steady 
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state. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the expected utilities at steady 
state and the rates of time preference; therefore, the expected utility at steady state can 
be expressed as a function of the rate of time preference. Let ∗xc  be a set of 
steady-state consumptions, given a set of time preference rates (θx) and other fixed 
exogenous parameters. The function θ → W argued above can be described as  
 
( ) ( )[ ]( )WcuEθg == ∗ , 
 
where ∗∗ ∈ xcc  and xθθ∈ . On the other hand, the rate of time preference is a 
continuous function of steady-state consumption as shown in the model (21) such that 
( ) ( )[ ]{ }∗∗∗∗∗ == cuEθWθθ . The reverse function is  
 
( ) ( )[ ]( )WcuEθh == ∗ . 
 
  The equilibrium rate of time preference is determined by the point of 
intersection of the two functions, ( )θg  and ( )θh , as shown in Figure 4. Figure 5 
shows a special but conventionally assumed ( )θh , in which θ is not sensitive to W, 
and the rate of time preference is constant permanently. There exists a point of 
intersection because both ( )θg  and ( )θh  are monotonously continuous for 0>θ . 
( )θh  is monotonously continuous because ( )Wθ ∗∗  is monotonously continuous. 
( )θg  is monotonously continuous because, as a result of utility maximization, 
( )∗∗ = k fc  and ( )∗∗= dkkdf  θ , where ∗k  is capital input per capita at steady state 
such that ( )tt kk ∞→∗ = lim . Because ( )∗k f  and ( )∗
∗
dk
kdf  are monotonously continuous 
for 0>∗k , c* is a monotonously continuous function of θ for 0>θ . Here, because u 
is monotonously continuous, then ( )[ ] ( )θgcuE =∗0  is also monotonously continuous 
for 0>θ .  
  The function ( ) ( )[ ] WcuEθg == ∗  is a decreasing function of θ because the 
higher rate of time preference results in the lower steady state consumption. The 
function ( ) ( )[ ] WcuEθh == ∗  is also a decreasing function of θ because 0<
dW
dθ . Thus, 
both ( )θg  and ( )θh  are decreasing, but the slope of ( )θh  is steeper than that of 
( )θg  as shown in Figure 4. This is true because ( ) Wθg = is the consequence of the 
Ramsey-type model indicated in equations (1) and (2); thus, if ∞→θ , then ( ) 0→=Wθg  because ∞→= tiθ  and 0→tk , and if 0→θ , then ( ) ∞→=Wθg  
because 0→= tiθ  and ∞→tk . On the other hand, the function ( ) Wθh =  
indicates the endogeneity of time preference, and because the rate of time preference is 
usually neither zero nor infinity, then even if ( ) 0→=Wθh , ∞<θ , and  
( ) ∞→=Wθh , θ<0 . Hence, the locus ( ) Wθh = cuts the locus ( ) Wθg =  
downwards from the top, as shown in Figure 4. Because the locus ( ) Wθh =  is more 
vertical than ( ) Wθg = , a permanently constant rate of time preference, as shown in 
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Figure 5, has probably been used as an approximation of the locus ( ) Wθh =  for 
simplicity.  
 
3.2.2.2  Stability of the model 
  The rate of time preference is constant unless a shock that changes the 
expectation of c* occurs. This is self-evident by ( )[ ]∗= cuEW . W does not depend on t 
but on the expectation of c*; thus, the same rate of time preference and steady state 
continue until such a shock hits the economy. Therefore, the endogeneity of time 
preference matters only when such a shock occurs. This constancy is the key for the 
stability of the model (21). Once the rate of time preference corresponding to the 
intersection is determined, it is constant and the economy converges at a unique steady 
state unless a shock that changes the expectation of c* occurs. This shock is exogenous 
to the model, and the economy does not explode endogenously but stabilizes at the 
steady state. Hence, the property 0<
dW
dθ  in model (21), which is consistent with 
empirical findings, does not cause instability. 
  Model (21) therefore is acceptable as a model of endogenous time preference, 
which indicates that, because the rate of time preference is endogenously determined, 
irrationality is not necessary for determination of the time preference rate. Nevertheless, 
a shock on the rate of time preference is initiated by a shock on the expectation of c*; 
thus, even though animal spirits are directly irrelevant to determination of the time 
preference rate, they may be relevant to the generation of shock on the expectation of 
c*. This possibility is examined in Section 4. 
 
3.3  Uncertainty and time preference 
  An important feature of the model (21) is that a shock on uncertainty makes 
the rate of time preference shift, where uncertainty means the stochastic nature of the 
steady-state consumption (c*). This is not a new idea. Fisher (1930) argued that 
uncertainty, or risk, must naturally have an influence on the rate of time preference, 
and higher uncertainty tends to raise the rate of time preference. This feature is 
particularly important for examining the mechanism of depression, because it has been 
reported that uncertainty increases in a depression (e.g., Romer, 1990).  
  The uncertainty about c* can be described by the stochastic dominance of the 
distribution of c* in a second-degree sense or a Rothschild-Stigliz sense. Given ( )∗cF , 
a subjective cumulative distribution function of ( )bca c <<≤ ∗∗ 0 ,  
 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )∫ ∗∗∗ == ba cdFcucuEW .                  (22) 
 
Consider two steady-state consumptions ∗1c  and 
∗
2c . Because ( )∗cu  is increasing 
and concave in c*, then ( )[ ] ( )[ ] cuE cuE ∗∗ ≤ 1020  if ( )∗1cF  second degree stochastically 
dominates ( )∗2cF , with strict inequality for a set of values of c* with positive 
probability. If ( )∗1cF  stochastically dominates ( )∗2cF  in the Rothschild-Stigliz 
sense, then ( )[ ] ( )[ ] cuE cuE ∗∗ ≤ 12  and the mean of c* is preserved as well. 
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  Suppose that a shock on the distribution of c* occurs, which preserves the 
mean but makes the uncertainty increase for any θ. Because utility ( )∗cu  is 
increasing and concave, this increase in uncertainty indicates a shift of the locus 
( ) Wθg =  downwards to the bold dashed line shown in Figure 4, because ( )[ ]∗= cuEW  
becomes smaller for any θ. Hence, if the uncertainty about c* increases from ( )∗1cF  
to ( )∗2cF  in the Rothschild-Stigliz sense, ( )[ ]∗= cuEW  decreases. Even though the 
mean of c* is not preserved, if the uncertainty about c* increases from ( )∗1cF  to ( )∗2cF  in the second-degree sense, ( )[ ]∗= cuEW  also decreases. If the mean of c* 
decreases simultaneously, the locus ( ) Wθg =  shifts further downwards to the thin 
dashed line in Figure 4. Therefore, the equilibrium rate of time preference increases; 
that is, increased uncertainty makes households more myopic. The effect of uncertainty 
in the model (21) is thus consistent with Fisher’s (1930) argument.4  
 
4.  GOVERNMENT FAILURE 
 
  Animal spirits may influence the generation of shocks on the expectation of c*, 
but the arbitrary assumption of animal spirits is not compelling. In this section, I 
explore a mechanism that generates a shock on the expectation of c* without the need 
to invoke animal spirits. 
 
4.1  Policy-induced stochastic processes 
4.1.1  A stochastic process with an absorbing state 
  Because it is not present consumption (ct) but steady-state consumption (c*) 
that matters, the factor that generates a shock on the expectation of c* should have 
persistent effects on consumption. Thereby, the factor should be one of the deep 
parameters (e.g., TFP and preferences) that can change the steady state. In addition, 
since it has been reported that uncertainty increases in a depression (e.g., Romer, 1990), 
the factor should make c* be expected to be random with a constant probability 
distribution. For the endogenous variable c* to be expected to be random, exogenous 
random variables are required because, without exogenous random variables, 
endogenous variables are constant at steady state. Nevertheless, exogenous variables 
that make c* be expected to be substantially random with a constant probability 
distribution are not easily found among the deep parameters. If the exogenous 
stochastic valuable is a stationary process with a known constant steady-state 
probability distribution, c* is expected to be smoothed by the stochastic Ramsey-Euler 
equation and to become nearly deterministic (e.g., Brock and Mirman, 1972; Mirman 
and Zilcha, 1977). On the other hand, if it is a random walk, it does not have a constant 
probability distribution.  
  Hence, for c* to be expected to be substantially random with a constant 
probability distribution, a special process of the exogenous stochastic variable is 
required. The following jump process with an absorbing state (Vt) is such a process. 
For an unknown future period ( )tt <0 ,  
                                                  
4 Harashima (2004a) shows that the rate of time preference and uncertainty in Japan simultaneously 
rose at the end of 1990s just before Japan entered a severe and persistent economic slump.  
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                ( )( )⎩⎨
⎧
≤
<≤−=
ttifstateabsorbingticdeterminis
ttifstateabsorbingnonrandom
Vt
0    ,         (23) 
 
where there are finite ( )NM ∈  deterministic states after the period t . Which of the 
states becomes the absorbing state of Vt after t   is unknown until t , but the 
probability distribution of the absorbing state is known for any t before t . Let state ( )Mm ∈  take the value vm and its probability density function be ( )mvτ . Then, the 
present expected value of Vt at steady state is ( ) ( )∑
=∞→
=
M
m
mmtt
vvVE
1
lim τ . If the value of 
each state is time-variable as vm,t but converges at each constant value if t → ∞, then 
the present expected value of Vt at steady state is ( ) ( )∑
= ∞→∞→∞→
=
M
m
tmttmttt
vvVE
1
,, limlimlim τ  
and its probability density function is ( )tmt v ,lim∞→τ . An important feature of the 
process Vt is that c* is not expected to be smoothed by the stochastic Ramsey-Euler 
equation because it is only after t  that one of the deterministic paths (vm,t) that is 
chosen as the absorbing state is known, and consumption proceeds solely in 
accordance with this unique deterministic path. Therefore c* is expected to be random 
with a constant probability distribution depending on randomly distributed 
deterministic paths vm,t after t . 
 
4.1.2  Policy-induced elements 
  An important feature of this Vt-type process is that the unique future 
deterministic path is decided in the future. This feature is often observed in a 
government’s policy decisions, which often take time to make. Once the government 
has made a decision, the path is deterministic, but before the decision, the path is 
uncertain. Governments sometimes postpone decisions because they are difficult (e.g., 
tax hike decisions). As a result, before the policy is decided, households have 
uncertainty with a constant probability distribution of the deterministic path. Hence, 
the necessity of a Vt-type process for the exogenous variable that makes c* be expected 
to be substantially random with a constant probability distribution suggests that the 
exogenous variable is policy related. 
  A Vt-type process implies that, even though the exogenous variable is a 
stationary process, if it has break points in its process then c* can be expected to be 
substantially random. The factors that break a stationary process require exogenous 
mechanisms. Some structural changes in the mechanism of forming TFP or preferences 
will be necessary. Nevertheless, the mechanisms of forming TFP and preferences do 
not usually change. One of the few possibilities for change is that the mechanism is 
policy related because policies are changed at the discretion of governments, and 
stationary processes will occasionally break if they are related to policies. Therefore, 
the necessary properties of the exogenous variable, whether it takes a Vt-type process 
or not, suggest that the exogenous variable is policy related. The policy-induced 
element in TFP is particularly important, because production is substantially affected 
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by the TFP level.5  
 
4.2  A policy-induced financial element in TFP 
4.2.1  Financial elements in TFP 
  An important element in TFP is natural science technologies and knowledge. 
They are usually assumed to be stochastic, primarily because of the random nature of 
scientific discoveries and inventions. However, that randomness implies a random 
walk that has no constant probability distribution and, more importantly, no steady 
state. Therefore, scientific technology and knowledge will not be the element in TFP 
that changes the expected distribution of c*. 
  Elements in TFP are not limited, however, to natural science technologies and 
knowledge. In the production function αtαtt kωAy −= 1  (equation (16)), At usually 
indicates natural science technologies and knowledge, but TFP is not At but αtωA . If ω 
contains a policy-induced element, TFP is affected by the policy. Financial elements 
are included in this group of policy-induced elements. Economic development is 
proportionate to the level of financial development (e.g., Wachtel, 2003; Do and 
Levchenko, 2007), and wide differences of financial development have existed 
between developed and developing economies. Many studies have concluded that the 
causality is from financial development to economic activities (e.g., Levine, 1997; La 
Porta el al., 1998; Levine et al., 2000). In addition, the importance of financial 
development as a driving force of economic growth has been repeatedly emphasized 
(e.g., Levine, 1997; Levine et al., 2000; Temple, 2000; Easterly and Levine, 2003). 
Financial development reduces friction in markets, especially in capital accumulation 
and technological innovation (e.g., Levine, 1997), and financial systems play a critical 
role in allocation of resources, which is crucial for innovative activities (e.g., 
Schumpeter, 1912/1934; Shaw, 1973). These facts and arguments indicate that the 
financial element in TFP is an important determinant of the parameter ω and has 
significant effects on TFP. An important feature of the financial element is that it is 
closely related to government policies and thus has a Vt-type process, because there is 
an important imperfection in financial markets—there is asymmetric information 
between borrowers (firms) and lenders (investors)—and it needs to be eliminated by 
government.  
 
4.2.2  Asymmetric information 
  The problem of imperfection in financial markets has long been studied (e.g., 
Gertler, 1988; Mishkin, 1991). Lenders usually have less information than borrowers. 
Under this asymmetric information, lenders may lend their money to less appropriate 
and lower quality borrowers, which indicates that resources including technologies are 
not optimally allocated in the economy.6 If there is no asymmetric information, the 
optimal allocation of resources in the economy will be achieved by rational activities 
of investors, but if there is asymmetric information, the allocation will be distorted. 
                                                  
5 The policies on TFP related to c* are usually policies on economic structure and do not include 
discretionary macro-economic (fiscal and monetary) policies. 
6 Not all technologies are embodied in a unit of capital, and each capital embodies only a portion of 
technologies. The adequate allocation of technologies over capital is important for maximizing 
production efficiency. 
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Non-optimal allocation of resources decreases the economy’s overall efficiency, and 
TFP becomes lower in the long run if asymmetric information is left as it is.   
  Financial intermediaries mitigate the asymmetric information. Because 
financial intermediaries join in activities between firms and investors, the asymmetric 
information is separated into two parts: between firms and financial intermediaries, and 
between financial intermediaries and investors. The former will be reduced 
substantially by activities of financial intermediaries that monitor and investigate 
information on firms. Nevertheless, the latter is usually not easily minimized because 
of the principal-agent problem between investors and financial intermediaries. A 
financial intermediary (the agent) has an incentive to divert its behaviors from what an 
investor (the principal) wishes if there is asymmetric information and the investor does 
not know whether the contract has been satisfied. As a result, markets are distorted.  
  To reduce the principal-agent problem, investors must sufficiently monitor 
financial intermediaries. Investors, however, including individual small depositors of 
banks, cannot sufficiently monitor the intermediaries because such monitoring requires 
very complex processes, special skills, and a great deal of technical knowledge. More 
importantly, it is necessary to access perfect information on financial intermediaries 
and firms. If signals in financial markets contain and transmit perfect information on 
financial intermediaries and firms, investors may sufficiently monitor financial 
intermediaries, but many empirical studies have shown that the information is not 
perfect. For example, DeYoung et al. (2001) show that supervisors’ assessments of 
banks contain some information that is not incorporated into prices of subordinated 
debts in markets. Other studies have also shown that signals from financial markets do 
not contain and transmit information perfectly (e.g., see Berger et al., 2000; Curry et al., 
2003; Furlong and Williams, 2006). Such imperfect market signals suggest that some 
information—in particular, bad information—is deliberately hidden from markets. 
 
4.2.3  The financial supervision authority 
  The market’s inability to solve the problem of asymmetric information 
justifies the government’s intervention to eliminate the distortion. On behalf of 
investors, the financial supervision authority eliminates the asymmetric information. 
As argued in Section 4.2.2, the problem of asymmetric information is separated into 
two parts. With addition of a financial supervision authority, the problem is further 
divided: asymmetric information between firms and financial intermediaries, between 
financial intermediaries and the authority, and between the authority and investors. The 
first two parts can be solved by financial intermediaries and the authority, respectively. 
The last part is not necessarily easily solved, however, because investors cannot fully 
monitor the authority’s activities. They have to trust the authority. Hence, 
self-regulation is quite important for the authority.  
  It is very difficult to be perfect, and the supervision may occasionally fail. 
Such failure is more likely to occur and be more severe after regulations have been 
substantially changed, for example, after deregulation. In such cases, the financial 
supervision authority has to innovate to adapt to the new regulations. Because the 
authority is a monopoly, its failure is not a single negligible error among many 
authorities,7 and once the supervision fails, its negative effects will spread widely 
                                                  
7 In some economies, the authority is separated across a few branches in the government, depending on 
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through financial markets. In addition, there is also a principal-agent problem between 
the authority and investors. The authority has an incentive to hide its failure from 
investors, and if the authority deliberately hides its failure, investors cannot easily 
know of the failure. 
  If asymmetric information is unchecked because of the failure of supervision, 
financial intermediaries will obtain extra profits thanks to the asymmetric information. 
The negative effect of non-optimal allocation of resources will be recognized only by 
less-informed investors and households far later. Faced with the extra profits of 
financial intermediaries, less-informed investors and households may wrongly guess 
that technology is unexpectedly progressing more than it actually is. The lee-informed 
households will then undertake activities on the basis of this incorrect guess—activities 
that would be considered to be irrational if perfect information were available—and 
this may make the economy spuriously appear to be in a boom in the short run. 
 
4.2.4  Revelation of the failure of supervision 
  Even if an authority deliberately hides its failure, it is impossible to hide it 
forever. Because there is a gap between the distorted expectation by less-informed 
households and actual economic activities, the failure will eventually be revealed, 
perhaps by accident. When the failure is revealed, the trust in the financial supervision 
authority will immediately be lost, and the expectation of future policy will change 
suddenly and sharply. Because the financial element in TFP is a policy-induced 
element and has a Vt-type process, the expected probability distribution of the financial 
element in TFP at steady state will also immediately change. 
  The arguments in Section 4.2.2 indicate that the present financial element in 
TFP will not change suddenly and sharply, because the already allocated resources 
cannot change suddenly and sharply. Nevertheless, unlike the present financial element 
in TFP, the expected probability distribution of the financial element in TFP at steady 
state can change suddenly and sharply with the revelation of the failure of supervision. 
In addition, the failure of supervision implies that the expected distributions of the 
financial element in TFP and c* were wrongly formed before the revelation of the 
failure; thus, the revisions of the expected distributions of the financial element in TFP 
and c* resulting from the revelation will be more substantial than usual. As a result, the 
rate of time preference is immediately raised and a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto 
inefficient path will be immediately selected even though the present TFP is almost 
unchanged. 
 
5.  THE MECHANISM OF DEPRESSION 
 
5.1  Essence of the mechanism of depression 
  The mechanism of depression shown in this paper takes the following steps: 
 
1) There is asymmetric information between financial intermediaries and 
investors. 
2) The financial supervision authority fails to sufficiently eliminate the 
                                                                                                                                                
the type of financial intermediary, but each branch is a monopoly authority for each of type of 
intermediary.  
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asymmetric information. 
3) Financial intermediaries exploit extra profits as a result of the asymmetric 
information and the failed supervision, and the economy may spuriously look 
like a boom in the short run to less-informed investors and households. 
4) The exploitation distorts the allocation of resources and lowers TFP in the long 
run. 
5) The failure of supervision is revealed. 
6) The revealed government failure immediately lowers the expected financial 
element in TFP at steady state and increases uncertainty about it. 
7) The lowered expected financial element in TFP at steady state immediately 
lowers the expected steady-state consumption, and the increased uncertainty 
about the financial element in TFP at steady state immediately increases the 
uncertainty about steady-state consumption. 
8) The lowered expected steady-state consumption and increased uncertainty 
about it immediately raise the time preference rate of households. 
9) The effect of the upward time preference shift is immediately transmitted to the 
real economy through the link θit =  (equation 4). 
10) The steady state shifts to one with lower production and consumption. 
11) A Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path is immediately rationally 
selected by non-cooperative and risk-averse households, even in a frictionless 
economy. 
12) If there are the frictions, their effects are amplified by the Pareto inefficiency, 
and huge amounts of unutilized resources (e.g., unemployment and idle capital) 
are persistently generated. 
13) Production and consumption steadily decline to the level at the posterior steady 
state. 
 
 This multi-stage complex mechanism has the following distinguishing features: 
• The necessity of not only market but government failure 
• TFP as a catalyst 
• Uncertainty as an intermediate  
• The endogeneity of time preference 
• A Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path selected by non-cooperative 
households 
 
The government failure to eliminate the market failure originates the depression by 
affecting the financial element in TFP. Thus, depression is closely related to TFP. 
However, this does not mean that a depression is caused by a technology shock, i.e., by 
a shift of the present TFP, but instead by a change of the expected TFP at steady state. 
In that sense, TFP does not play the leading role but rather is a catalyst for depression. 
During the process, an increase of uncertainty about c* is generated as an intermediate, 
which increases the rate of time preference. The increase in the time preference rate as 
the discount factor may trigger a stock market crash, which has accompanied 
depressions (e.g., Barro and Ursúa, 2009). The turbulences in the financial markets are 
then transmitted to the real variables through the link θit = , to satisfy which at steady 
state, it must be adjusted (see equation (4)). Then, a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto 
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inefficient path is selected by non-cooperative households. 
  The above-mentioned features are equally important, but the most essential 
element in the mechanism of depression is the endogeneity of time preference. A Nash 
equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path is probably generated only if the rate of time 
preference shifts upwards. With the endogeneity, turbulences in financial markets are 
immediately transmitted to the real economy through the link θit = . The key is not it 
but θ. In short, the mechanism shown in this paper indicates that a depression as a 
Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path is generated because the revealed 
incompetence of government and the resulting increased policy-induced uncertainty 
make non-cooperative and risk-averse households behave more myopically. 
 
5.2  Policies for preventing and recovering 
  What should or should not be done to prevent and recover from depressions? 
The following discussion offers answers suggested by the mechanism of depression 
shown in this paper. 
 
5.2.1  Policies for preventing a depression 
  Because the origin of depression is the failure of government supervision, the 
key to prevent depression is for the financial supervision authority to perfectly 
implement its delegated task. If the supervision is perfectly prudential and effective 
and sufficient information is provided to investors, markets approach perfect 
information and thereby few depressions will be generated. Therefore, it is important 
for the authority to self-regulate. Note, however, that the purpose of the supervision is 
not to tightly control financial intermediaries but to eliminate the asymmetric 
information, and the task delegated to the authority is to disseminate sufficient 
information on firms and financial intermediaries to investors. The government is not 
the manager of financial intermediaries but the referee of markets in which the 
financial intermediaries, firms, and investors participate. Conversely, financial 
intermediaries can freely do their business in principle if they give the authority perfect 
information about themselves and the firms they intermediate. Except for regulations 
with regard to providing perfect information to the authority, only activities that 
confuse investors and induce ex post irrational behaviors should be regulated.  
 
5.2.2  Policies for recovering from a depression 
5.2.2.1  Fiscal policy 
  Because the economy is on a Pareto inefficient path during a depression, 
government intervention is justified. Fiscal policies to fill the gap between the Pareto 
efficient and inefficient paths can improve the utilities of households without affecting 
capital formation. Fiscal policies to utilize unutilized resources (bt; Section 2) increase 
the utilities of households but do not necessarily reduce capital, because bt is neither 
consumed nor invested but simply discarded or preemptively not produced. Therefore, 
fiscal policies will ease the problems caused by the Pareto inefficiency without 
harming the future economy. If utilization of bt is done through government 
borrowings, government debt will increase. However, the increased debts are irrelevant 
to the formation of capital; thus, future production and consumption are also not 
affected. 
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  Even though fiscal policies will help, however, they do not have the power to 
change the steady state. Even if a large amount of fiscal stimulus is injected into the 
economy, the economy eventually will converge on the posterior lower production 
steady state corresponding to the raised rate of time preference. Therefore, it will not 
be possible to make the economy come back to the prior higher production steady state 
only by relying on fiscal policies. 
 
5.2.2.2  Monetary policy 
  Monetary policies are taken according to the instrument rule of the central 
bank and are basically taken in the same manner even during depression. Because the 
Pareto inefficiency widens output gaps, the interest rate as the instrument of the central 
bank needs to be lowered by the rule. The lower interest rate will temporarily increase 
production. However, as is the case with fiscal policies, monetary policies do not have 
the power to change the steady state and cannot make the economy come back to the 
prior higher production steady state.  
 In addition, lowering the interest rate according to the rule may not be 
sufficient. To prevent a deep deflation, the interest rate may have to be lowered more 
substantially and rapidly than is usually required by the rule. Harashima (2004c, 2007, 
2008) shows that, if an upward time preference shift of households widens the gap 
between the time preference rates of households and the government, inflation 
decreases, and in some cases, deflation is generated. If a deep deflation sets in and the 
real interest rate is forced to exceed the marginal productivity by the zero bound on 
nominal interest rates, markets cannot be cleared, and the situation will be significantly 
exacerbated (e.g., the Great Depression). A deep deflation can be prevented if the 
central bank lowers the interest rate more substantially and rapidly than usually 
required by the rule.  
 
5.2.2.3  Supervision reform 
 Supervision reform is necessary because the expectation of the financial 
element in TFP should be improved and policy-induced uncertainty should be reduced. 
Only with this reform can the economy return to the prior higher production steady 
state, because fiscal and monetary policies cannot shift the rate of time preference 
downwards. As shown in Section 4, policy-induced uncertainty is reduced after the 
policy is decided. If the reform decision is delayed, then uncertainty and the rate of 
time preference remain high for a longer period, and the costs of the depression will be 
exacerbated. In this context, the decision should be made as soon as possible. If the 
reform, however, overlooks the asymmetric information problem, the expectation of 
the financial element in TFP at steady state will remain low, and the rate of time 
preference will not fully return to the previous low rate even after the policy-induced 
uncertainty is eliminated. Therefore, reforms must never overlook the problem of 
asymmetric information. 
 Putting most financial intermediaries under tight governmental control or, 
alternatively, replacing their role in financial allocation in the economy by 
governments, may be effective as an emergency measure to make the economy recover 
rapidly from depression, because this measure will significantly reduce policy-induced 
uncertainty if the government is politically stable. The famous rapid recovery of the 
German economy from the Great Depression in the mid-1930s (e.g., Temin, 1989) may 
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be partly attributed to this effect. Recapitalization of failed financial intermediaries by 
using public money may also be needed. The purpose of the recapitalization is not to 
rescue the failed financial intermediaries but to protect small investors, smooth the 
difficulties of the reform, and reduce policy-induced uncertainty. Recapitalization, as 
well as many other government interventions, nevertheless can generate the problem of 
moral hazard. Thus, these measures should be as temporary as possible and should be 
accompanied by various measures to keep the moral hazard problem to a minimum.  
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 During a depression, unemployment substantially increases and capital 
utilization rate significantly falls. Frictions on quantity and price adjustments appear to 
be insufficient to explain the generation mechanism of these large-scale persisting 
phenomena. This insufficiency suggests that some unknown mechanism amplifies the 
effects of the frictions. In this paper, I argue that the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto 
inefficient path is that mechanism. Such a Nash equilibrium is generated because 
households are risk averse and non-cooperative. If the Nash equilibrium is generated, 
additional huge extra unutilized resources (e.g., unemployment and idle capital) will be 
persistently generated. The paper shows that a depression as a Nash equilibrium of a 
Pareto inefficient path is generated even in a frictionless economy if, and probably 
only if, the rate of time preference shifts upwards. The situation when the rate of time 
preference shifts upwards is described by a non-cooperative mixed strategy game. In 
this game, a strategy profile consisting of strategies of choosing a Pareto inefficient 
transition path of consumption to the posterior steady state is a Nash equilibrium. 
 Nevertheless, why does the rate of time preference shift upwards? Keynes 
(1936) implied that animal spirits—moods like pessimism or optimism—overwhelm 
rationality and are an important factor in a depression. This paper argues that animal 
spirits are not necessary and presents an endogenous time preference model, in which 
the rate of time preference is determined not by the present but by the expected 
steady-state consumption. The model is consistent with many empirical observations 
that the rate of time preference is negatively correlated with permanent income (e.g., 
Lawrance, 1991). A shock that changes the expected steady-state consumption shifts 
the rate of time preference, and a source of the shock is policy-induced shocks to the 
financial element in TFP. A failure of government supervision of financial markets 
originates the shock to the expected steady-state consumption, resulting in an upward 
time preference shift. With the endogeneity of time preference, the turbulences in 
financial markets are transmitted to the real economy through the link θit = . It is not 
the behavior of it but that of θ that induces a depression.  
 In summary, a depression is generated because the revealed incompetence of 
government and increased policy-induced uncertainty make non-cooperative and 
risk-averse households behave more myopically, resulting in a Nash equilibrium of a 
Pareto inefficient path. 
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Figure 2: The paths of Jalone and NJalone 
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Figure 3: A Pareto inefficient transition path 
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Figure 4: Endogenous time preference 
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Figure 5: Permanently constant time preference 
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